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## **Economic and Non-Economic Factors in the Dynamics of International Migration\***

SOCIAL scientists have hardly explored, let alone adequately researched, the dynamics of international migration. The reasons are not hard to find. Though decision-making, the basis of these dynamics, is centrally a problem for social psychologists, when applied to emigration it requires perception and careful synthesis of economic, demographic, sociological and political forces in both the country of emigration and the country of proposed immigration. Researchers are therefore required to "emigrate" themselves from their base disciplines to other "territories" where, with foreign colleagues, they may construct interdisciplinary models to explain the dynamics of international migration. So far, academic researchers have shown reluctance to make such journeys.

### **Macro-Dynamics** -

*Economic* theories on the determinants of emigration are for the most part only variations of those proposed decades ago in which individual decisions to emigrate were "explained" by theories based upon fairly rigid and unrealistic assumptions. The liberal theory of emigration attempted to explain movement on the basis of two propositions : (/) individual free migration is determined by the economic self-interest of

\*My emphasis in this paper has been on the economic, demographic, sociological and political constraints on emigration, especially by Europeans to Australia. This is done in the sincere belief that concentration upon those aspects of migration, in which some research has been undertaken, will engender more fruitful discussion than would general observation on the dynamics of international migration as a whole.

the migrant, i.e., "economic man" always acts to maximise his real income, and (ii) the economic self-interest of the individual coincides with the general interest<sup>1</sup>. There was no place in this liberal, *laissez faire* doctrine for state intervention. In the long run, individual, national and international interests will coincide; any positive action by the State would therefore be a check or hindrance to these interests.

The liberal theory of emigration is generally expressed in the same comparative statics which characterises the marginal theory of production. With given capital and natural resources in both countries, labour will emigrate from country A (with lower productivity) to country B until productivities are equated and there is no incentive for further emigration. The assumptions underlying the theory are so rigid that it can do little more than emphasise that workers will move to countries where the real return for their labour is higher—a proposition underlying most observations concerning contemporary emigration. The difficulty of applying any conclusions based upon marginal productivity theory was under-scored by Paul Douglas who, in attempting to measure marginal productivity of labour in Massachusetts, and in two Australian States, had to assume perfect mobility of labour and capital, perfect competition on the labour market, full employment of the factors of production and the absence of state intervention!<sup>2</sup>

Debate in economics journals during early post-War years on whether trade could be a complete substitute for mobility of capital and labour (migration) was just as unsatisfactory as had been the liberal theory to explain the dynamics of international migration, and for similar reasons. Though the debate involved such eminent economists as Paul Samuelson, Harry Johnston, Ivor Pearce and J. R. Hicks, J. F. Meade finally arbitrated a "no contest" on grounds that the restrictive assumptions underlying factor-price equalisation were unlikely ever to be achieved. Indeed, had Paul Samuelson been content to keep the debate at the abstract level at which A. P. Lerner introduced it in 1933, i.e. that under certain *conditions* trade was a substitute for migration of labour and capital, it would probably have gone unnoticed by all but professional economists.

1. Isaac, Julius, *Economics of Migration*, London, 1947 ; Thomas, Brinley, *International Migration and Economic Development*, UNESCO, Paris, 1961.

2. Thomas, Brinley, *op. cit.*

Instead, he applied a Lerner-type model to a *particular* situation—post-War United Kingdom. When the economic heavens fell upon him, Samuelson admitted that he had been rash in drawing "a moral concerning the worth of emigration from Europe out of an abstract simplified model"<sup>3</sup>. Abstract it most certainly was, constrained by such assumptions as free trade, free competition, a 2-country/2-commodity/2-factor world, no specialisation and identical production functions in both countries for the same products. Even so, in his summing up of the debate, J. E. Meade thought that given more reasonable postulates, it could be demonstrated that free trade must be *accompanied* by international migration if total production in the international economy was to be maximised. Consistent with his plea for "more reasonable postulates", Meade then envisaged situations requiring government *control* over international migration :

From countries where demographic conditions were leading to a rapid and uncontrolled increase in population. "Freedom of international migration", he wrote, "demands some control of domestic births in the countries of emigration so that it does not lead to an unlimited expansion in the total of world population"<sup>4</sup>. Between countries with different domestic policies for the distribution of income and property.

Though Meade was pointing the way for fruitful involvement by his colleagues concerned with the economics of international migration, the debate was nonetheless a landmark in the literature primarily because it had emphasised the dangers of applying, simple, constrained models to real-world situations. In the case of international migration, as in the case of the marginal productivity theory concerning micro-dynamics, the application was singularly inappropriate. National governments legislate to maintain or improve GNP and real income per head, and will encourage or restrict immigration (and capital inflows) to the extent that it facilitates these objectives. Brinley Thomas was soon to show that the relatively unimpeded mobility of capital and labour across the Atlantic had long since ended<sup>5</sup>. Between 1840 and 1914 the "long swings" of

3. Thomas, Brinley, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

5. Thomas, Brinley, *Migration and Economic Growth*, Cambridge, 1954.

economic development were inverse to one another and coincided with a one-way traffic of capital and labour. In one period the marginal efficiency of investment abroad governed the level of activity in Europe and hence the volume of emigration. In another, the marginal efficiency of domestic investment, as well as the supply of loanable funds, dominated the scene and restricted the volume of emigration. But these relationships gradually weakened as the United States became a dominant industrial power, and ended with restrictions on the number of emigrants permitted to enter that country. The Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 coincided with policies by the British Government to encourage its people to emigrate to British countries overseas. The Empire Settlement Act of 1922, and the supporting trade and tariff agreements between countries of the British Empire, were designed to establish an economic 'bloc'<sup>6</sup>. Emigration of people and of capital thus became a significant plank in economic policies of Empire countries.

Since the 1950's, research into the economics of migration has moved away from abstract model-building to empirical work on the costs of emigration to the sending country and the gains of immigration to the receiving country. Every migrant brings a measure of education, training and experience which is a clear gain to the country he enters, its cost having been borne by the country whence he came. Attempts to assess such gains and costs have revealed many definitional and accounting problems leading to widely varying estimates. Similar problems have impeded progress of research into other aspects of migration, although much more could have been done had more scholars been attracted to the field. In Australia, e.g., a country which has received millions of immigrants since 1945, the 'advantages' have been little more than tabulated. Available for employment as soon as they arrive, migrants are a necessary mobile element in the work-force. By enlarging the domestic market, immigrants encourage producers to increase their scale of operations, thereby engendering economies of scale and productivity. If businessmen are confident that immigration will be retained at declared levels, their propensity to invest on the basis of expected rising markets will be high. Likewise, the 'disadvantages' of immigration have also been merely tabulated or, at best, desultory attempts made to assess costs

6. Hancock, W.K., *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol.2, *Problems of Economic Policy*, 1918-1939, Part 1, Oxford, 1940.

from published statistics. Migrants require the expenditure of large amounts of capital to service their resettlement. They add to the capital-deepening process (i.e. improvement of industrial productivity by the use of more capital intensive processes), and also make immediate demands upon the capital-widening process (social overheads such as schools, houses, public works etc.)<sup>7</sup>.

Economists in Australia, as elsewhere<sup>8</sup>, who have attempted to analyse the effects of large-scale immigration have generally found them both difficult to define and very difficult to measure as they spread throughout the whole economy. In his econometric model of Australia for 1948-61, J. Kmenta tried to measure the nature and magnitude of the effects of immigration on excess aggregate demand. When he concluded that it was less important than other predetermined factors, another economist, Duloy, criticised his estimates and, by implication, his technique and reported that his research had shown that immigration *did* have significant effects on the demand for housing, motor cars and imports, and that these persist for several years after immigrants reach the country<sup>9</sup>. Their disagreement largely reflects both the difficulties of prosecuting research in this field and the dearth of adequate basic data.

### Micro-Dynamics

If the macro-dynamics of international migration have become increasingly conditioned, and complicated, by national immigration policies and, to a lesser extent, by national emigration policies, we may well ask whether the micro-dynamics—individual decisions to emigrate—have also been complicated and conditioned by the same policies. Unfortunately, the historical dearth of well-planned research into the micro-

7. The Academy of Social Sciences in Australia is supporting research on the impact of immigration into Australia. Several studies have been commissioned on income and expenditure patterns, professionally qualified immigrants and immigrants in the motor industry. These studies, together with work commissioned by the National Population Inquiry (Professor W.D. Borrie), Jolley, R.T. Appleyard and J. Wilson comprise the bulk of research into the economics of immigration.

8. E.g., Jones, K. and Smith A.D., *The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Immigration*, C.U.P. 1970.

9. Kmenta, J., "An Econometric Model of Australia, 1948-61", *Australian Economic Papers*, December 1966; Duloy, J.H., "Structural Changes due to Immigration: An Econometric Study", *Australian Econometric Papers*, December 1967.

dynamics of migration precludes an answer to such a direct comparative question. While we may reject the simplistic explanation underlying the liberal theory of emigration as being applicable today, and perhaps even in the nineteenth century, we really do not know why, in the hey-day of free migration when there were relatively few political constraints, some Europeans emigrated to America while others, with seeming similar socio-economic characteristics, stayed at home.

Decision-making processes concerning emigration constitute a complicated facet of psycho-social research in which economists can play a minor role. But here again there has been a dearth of research. Eisenstadt's three-stage 'model' of the total process : (1) the motivation to emigrate or the needs and dispositions which urge people to move from one place to another; (2) the social structure of the actual migratory process or of the physical transition from the original society to a new one ; and (3) the absorption of the immigrants within the social and cultural framework of the new society, remain a conceptual benchmark in migration studies<sup>10</sup>. However, Eisenstadt was concerned primarily with the *absorption* of immigrants into the State of Israel, and stage (1) was included in the conceptual framework mainly to suggest the *total* process. Of stage (1), he wrote :

"The literature on migration ... abound in indications that the migrant feels some kinds of frustration, or inability to attain some level of aspiration in his original society, where he is unable to gratify all his expectations or to fulfil the role of his desire ... It is this feeling of frustration and inadequacy, whatever its cause, that motivates migration, and it is the existence of some objective opportunity that makes it possible to realize the aspiration to migrate. For this reason, immigrants also tend to develop certain definite expectations in regard to the role that they will fulfil in their new country".

Eisenstadt suggested that the frustrations which probably trigger decisions to emigrate may be due to a variety of causes : over-population, the shrinkage of economic opportunities, the opening up of new cultural and economic horizons and channels of communication, political oppression and so on.

10. Eisenstadt, S.N., *The Absorption of Immigrants*, London, 1954.

## Empirical Studies

In 1958, Appleyard and his colleagues at the Australian National University were sufficiently impressed by the logic of Eisenstadt's approach to the micro-dynamics of emigration to make it the basis of a major longitudinal study of assisted British emigrants to Australia<sup>11</sup>. About the same time, Frijda and his colleagues in the Netherlands embarked on a similar study of Dutch emigrants to a number of overseas countries<sup>12</sup>. Alan Richardson and L. B. Brown, both psychologists, were also exploring the decision-making processes of small numbers of British emigrants<sup>13</sup>. The findings of these studies, conducted within a few years of each other, therefore, provide considerable insight into the micro-dynamics of emigration.

The major limitation of these studies, as acknowledged by the authors, is that they relate only to small groups of emigrants between specific countries during short periods. Assisted emigration from Britain to Australia, or from the Netherlands to Canada, was, at that time, a selected movement comprising only persons whom the country of immigration was willing to accept and financially assist. This not only emphasises the importance of political constraints in modern migrations, but also means that the decision-making processes described below tell nothing of potential migrants who were unacceptable. It may be added that the Appleyard and Frijda studies were longitudinal in character, and the research conducted in Europe, and reported here, relates only to stage (I) of Eisenstadt's conceptual framework.

Stage (1) of the Appleyard study 'formalised' Eisenstadt's general observations into an interview schedule of four parts : the socio-economic characteristics of the sampled emigrants (compared, where possible, to those of non-emigrants); the decision to emigrate; expectations of Australia and knowledge of Australia. It was expected that this would

11. Appleyard, R.T., *British Emigration to Australia*, Canberra, 1964.

12. 'Emigrants-Non Emigrants': in G. Beijer (ed.), *Characteristics of Overseas Migrants*, pp. 51-141.

13. Richardson, Alan, "Some Psycho-Social Aspects of British Emigration to Australia", *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 10, 1959, pp. 327-37; Brown, L. B., "English Migrants to New Zealand : A Pilot Rorschach Study", *Australian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 8.No.2, 1956, pp. 106-10.

test whether the assisted emigrants were different (in terms of socio-economic characteristics) to non-emigrants, whether they were in fact 'frustrated' and unable therefore to attain desirable levels of aspiration in Britain, how they approached the emigration threshold and the influence which expected differences in real income between Britain and Australia exerted on that 'approach', why they finally stepped across the threshold and whether they did in fact have formal expectations, and accurate knowledge, of Australia.

In-depth interviews with 862 families and single adult migrants in their homes just prior to their departure for Australia confirmed the applicability of Eisenstadt's conceptual framework for stage (I). Respondents tended to feel insecure and inadequate in their social setting and were attracted by the objective opportunities which Australia seemed to offer. While emigration was certainly not the only solution acceptable to Britons who felt this way, it was significant that nearly all the sampled emigrants had been at the emigration threshold for a number of years and accumulated frustrations, rather than specific incidents, finally decided them to step across that threshold. The most common frustration related to their work situation and the absence of prospects for advancement. Their knowledge of Australia, especially economic conditions such as wages, hours etc., which would personally affect them, was good, as was the feasibility of their expectations. Most had acquired an adequate knowledge of the country's economic and social conditions and related this knowledge to their expectations. -Despite differing approaches to the emigration threshold, economic-type reasons dominated approaches to the emigration threshold, economic-type reasons dominated replies to open-end questions concerning motives : "The hope for better opportunities for myself and my children" was the main "reason" for emigrating given by over 80% of married couples. And yet, one got the distinct impression that neither frustrations and inadequacies of their social setting, nor even the reasons given for choosing Australia, were compelling inadequacies and reasons, like insufferable poverty, for which emigration was the *only* solution. The breadwinners were predominantly skilled workers who earned on the average £13 per week and one-third of them expected to transfer over £800 to Australia. Over 37% of all families owned motor cars, 33% owned washing machines and 55% owned television receivers. None was unemployed at the time of decision-making, although at mid-1959 over 400,000 Britons were registered as unemployed.

British emigrants to Australia in 1959 were moderately well-off; they were travelling from one English-speaking society to another, where institutions, loyalties and "attitudes" were predominantly British and where they would not experience the racial, ethnic and language difficulties experienced by many non-British, non-English-speaking immigrants.

Appleyard and Anna Amara adopted a similar procedure to investigate the micro-dynamics of Greek emigration to Australia in 1964. Although the majority of Greek emigrants to Australia were nominated by close relatives, those covered by the study were a special group of single workers (50 female and 75 male) who were sponsored by the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

The former British study revealed that many single British girls treated 'emigration' as a working-holiday; if they liked Australia they would stay, if they didn't they would return. Nearly all of them left well-paid jobs in Britain expecting to obtain higher-paid jobs in Australia. Their rather nonchalant attitudes towards the 'adventure' of emigration reflected the favourable conditions under which the assisted passage scheme operated, the employment market in Australia and the fact that they would not experience language problems, and very few social and cultural problems, in Australia.

What a contrast to the motivations and expectations of the single female Greek workers of the latter study ! There was no talk of 'adventure'. For many,- emigration was an escape from poverty in the isolated mountain villages whence they came. They wanted steady jobs and regular wages because intermittent employment and uncertain wages did not meet their own and their families' basic needs. In addition, in a dowry system under which a potential groom may demand more money than the family possessed, they were in danger of remaining 'on the shelf'. The main alternatives were to marry without dowry (socially unacceptable), to enter domestic service in Athens, Salonica or another large town or emigrate. They had chosen the last even though it was literally a journey into the unknown. The prospects of marriage in Australia, with a masculinity ratio of marriageable Greeks, were probably good, but the difficulties of coping with the English language were almost unthinkable. ICEM had attempted to prepare them for these difficulties by placing them in a Training School for several months prior to

embarkation where they learned basic English, hygiene and handling of modern electrically operated consumer durables. The course was not easy. Most were only 18 years old and had left school at 12 or 13 and worked as dressmakers or farm labourers. As might be expected, almost every girl in the sample said that poverty in the village and the prospect of regular work in Australia was their *sole* reason for leaving their homeland. Thirty-three of the 50 girls did not expect to take any money at all to Australia simply because they didn't have any.

The enormity of their decisions to emigrate to a foreign land on the other side of the world, and the dominance of economic-type motives in the decision, were conveyed by 'Helen' who told the interviewer :

"I was born in a village in the mountainous part of Peloponnesos. My family are shepherds and only in the winter are we in the house; during the summer we follow the goats. Most of the people that live in the village are farmers, but the majority of them have goats as well. There are about 160 families in our village. Nobody's income is enough to survive. The milk and cheese we make from the goats' milk is just enough to keep us from hunger and enough to pay the rent on the grazing land. Every year we borrow money from the bank in order to get bread. When we sell our products we get just enough to pay the bank and then we borrow money again. There is no leisure. We always work. If we are not with the goats we work in the fields and if we are not there we have the housework to do".

Though the setting is entirely different to that for British working-class urban emigrants, Eisenstadt's "... frustration (and) inability to attain some level of aspiration" is clear enough<sup>11</sup>. Helen's *expectations* of Australia, though less well articulated than those of a typical single English girl, were singularly economic : to get a job, any job, immediately she arrived and to save as much as possible so that she could sponsor her brothers, her sisters and finally her parents and other relatives. The family's future thus depended upon 18-year-old, unskilled, uneducated Helen establishing herself in Australia. When she arrived in Melbourne she had only \$11.

14. Similar motives were stated by rural to urban migrants in Greece. See National Statistical Service of Greece, *Report on the Exploratory Survey into Motivations and Circumstances of Rural Migration*, Athens: 1962.

If skilled British workers and their families have traditionally been the migrants most acceptable to Australian governments<sup>15</sup>, unskilled southern Europeans have traditionally been towards the end of the acceptability spectrum. Had Greeks been given the same incentives accorded to the British emigrants, the migration flow would have been much greater. This, of course, reflects the significance of government policies in determining modern migrations. In the mid-1960's Australia's total annual intake was decided on the basis of existing employment vacancies and projected economic growth. The extent to which these needs could not be met by British and northern-European immigrants largely determined the intake of southern Europeans. Thousands of Greeks may stand at the emigration threshold attracted by job opportunities and higher wages in Australia, America, Canada or a number of other countries but without the "objective opportunity that makes it possible to realize the aspiration to migrate" (Eisenstadt), emigration cannot take place. The single female workers sponsored by ICEM had been accorded objective opportunities by the Australian Government because they filled a perceived need, namely, to reduce the high masculinity ratio of marriageable Greeks in Australia, a legacy of past immigration policies.

Another study conducted for ICEM by Appleyard in 1964, using the same techniques adopted for the British and Greek studies noted above, emphasised that, in addition to "objective opportunities" to emigrate, there must be opportunities in the proposed country of immigration, for economic betterment. This study related to emigration from Spain to Latin America. By mid-1964 emigration to Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay had been reduced to a trickle following a steady flow during the mid-1950's. Indeed, by 1963 emigration from Spain to these four countries had been more than replaced by return migration. Spaniards hadn't stopped emigrating : they had merely changed direction from Latin America to northern Europe as a result of changed economic conditions and employment opportunities in each area. On the one hand, real wages in several main receiving countries had declined; e.g., in Argentina there had been a 5 per cent decline in GNP during 1963 but a 22 per cent rise in the cost of living between July 1963 and June 1964. Employment opportunities, especially for semi- and un-skilled immigrants, had been greatly reduced by rural-

15. Appleyard, R.T., *op.cit.*, Chapter 2.

urban migration, and countries of destination in Latin America had therefore imposed tighter restrictions on immigration. Skilled and professional workers were still encouraged, but such persons were increasingly reluctant to leave Spain not only because of uncertain prospect in Latin America, but also because of increasing opportunities in Spain arising from improved rates of economic growth. The in-depth interviews with emigrants, and the subsequent high proportion who decided not to go, clearly reflected conditions in Latin America *vis-a-vis* Spain and northern Europe.

The studies conducted by Appleyard and his colleagues, though they have thrown some light on the macro-dynamics of international migration, have posed more questions, than those they have provided answers to, on the micro-dynamics of international migration. L. B. Brown, on the other hand, went to the core of the decision-making process in his small, but significant study of British migrants in 1953. He used Rorschach tests with fifteen English single males who enlisted with the Royal New Zealand Air Force, with fifteen matched non-emigrants who re-enlisted in the Royal Air Force. He concluded, among other things, that more migrants than non-migrants had feelings of anxiety and showed a greater responsiveness to their environment. His methods attempted to assess whether migrants have significantly different personalities than non-migrants. Whatever the significance of the results, his methodology and objectives point the way to highly promising research on the micro-dynamics of international migration. Similarly, a study by Alan Richardson of eighty intending British migrants to Australia, and eighty matched non-migrants, using multi-choice questions on attitudes, concluded that intending migrants appeared to be more ambitious, more motivated and more interested in action and hard work than non-migrants. A similar study by Frijda in 1955 and 1956 with a large group of emigrants to several overseas countries and non-emigrants, revealed that emigrants displayed a "fairly profound dissatisfaction with life in Holland" and, in some respects, had a "somewhat more enterprising view of things". A unique, and fruitful, aspect of the Dutch study was interviews with a number of relatives and acquaintances (e.g. employers) *after* the emigrant had departed. The data from these interviews were then matched with information provided by the emigrant before he departed, thus providing a dossier on each respondent.

By probing the personalities of respondents, Brown, Richardson and Frijda went some way towards unravelling the complicated question of 'real' and 'stated' motivations. Appleyard, on the other hand, while testing the validity of economic theories relating to the micro-dynamics of migration, could not explain motivations in terms of personality characteristics. There is clearly a case for well-organised interdisciplinary research in this important area. As stated earlier, social scientists have hardly explored, let alone adequately researched, the dynamics of international migration. The most promising line of research is interdisciplinary beginning, perhaps, with the construction of models, followed by carefully-conceived studies at both the macro- and micro-level.

### **Political Constraints**

Throughout this paper, I have emphasised the major importance of political constraints in determining migratory flows, that the choices for potential emigrants in many countries are few, and in some cases non-existent. This point needs to be explored a little further and again I will draw mainly upon Australian material, indicating the bases of policies adopted in recent years by this major country of immigration. This, I hope, will serve to emphasise the complexity of policy determinants<sup>16</sup>.

Between the first settlement (in 1788) and 1861, immigration was the dominant determinant of population growth, partly because the high masculinity ratio of immigrants prevented widespread marriage and hence reproduction. The Australian colonies established during this period were British in character and allegiance, and inevitably established British-type institutions and favoured British immigrants. Even the gold-rushes of the 1850's and 1860's, which drew diggers from many parts of the world, did not affect subsequent policies concerning preferred ethnicity of immigrants. By the 1930's Australians were heard to boast that Australia was "more British" than Britain herself.

But the same Australians were also concerned about declining reproduction and projections which showed that if birth rates did not improve the total population would decline. In addition, the war of 1939-45 revealed how vulnerable the country was to invasion. Immigration was seen not only as a means of improving demographic trends, and provid-

16. See, Appleyard, R.T., *Immigration : Policy and Progress*, Sydney, 1971.

ing workers to service an expanding economy, but also as an instrument of defence against future aggression. To obtain the number of immigrants (measuring 1% of the total population per annum) necessary to achieve these objectives, successive Australian governments broke the tradition that immigrants should be predominantly British, and sought persons from all over Europe. The new policy, however, favoured Britishers and northern Europeans. As noted above, southern Europeans were accorded a low priority. There was certainly no place for persons who could not meet the Caucasian racial qualification.

Thus, immigration policy proceeded for more than 20 years on these broad principles, fluctuations in intake above or below the "1% criteria" depending mainly upon labour demand. The programme was highly organized; offices were established in almost every European country and applicants were tested for skills to make certain that they would fit into the Australian workforce with minimum dislocation. Between 1945 and 1969 over 3 million "immigrants" were absorbed into a base population (in 1945) of just over seven million.

In recent years, however, governments have questioned those parts of immigration policy which restrict the entry of non-Europeans. Economic ties with Britain have been greatly weakened and Japan, Asia's major industrial power, has become one of the most important nations in Australia's foreign trade. Although Australian government has shown more appreciation of the economic and political aspirations of nearby Asian countries, relations have been impeded by immigration policies which clearly discriminate against non-Caucasians. In 1966, the Australian government made a number of significant changes in its 'restricted' immigration policy, the immediate effect being that several thousand Asians in Australia were granted resident status and by 1970 several thousand more had been admitted as immigrants. Even so, the Minister of the day reaffirmed that the changes did not represent any major change in policy, the basic aim of which is to "preserve a homogeneous population".

Within Australia the objectives of immigration, and the numbers admitted, have recently come under criticism. The defence value of immigration as a central plank in post-war planning has been questioned, as have high rates of economic growth as a primary national objective. The

use of immigration to sustain high rates of economic growth so the argument runs, has drained enormous amounts of capital, especially for social overheads, which could have been directed into improving social, environmental and educational amenities of existing Australians.

This all-too-brief sketch of the determinants of Australian immigration policy nonetheless underscores the role of national objectives in deciding the race, ethnicity, characteristics and numbers of immigrants. Indeed, if migration is perceived as having even a minor role in redistribution of the world's population, then a major study should be undertaken on the determinants of policies, especially of countries actively engaged in immigration. Such a survey would reveal that many countries impose severe restrictions on immigration, limiting entry for permanent settlement mainly to overseas-born families of citizens, and to small quotas of highly skilled or professional workers<sup>17</sup>.

17. See, Appleyard, R.T. and Visaria, P., "International Migration Policy : Selected Asian Countries". *Proceedings of the International Population Conference, Liege, 1973*, Vol. 3, pp. 417-423.